phenomenological point of view, making explicit the assumptions which are involved in such an undertaking.
Paradoxically, the process of beginning at the beginning may best be undertaken by considering a statement taken from the end of psychotherapy. The patient is speaking, "When I came for psychotherapy, I had great anxiety and I had no hope other than you. When I found you, I felt you were the answer. Now, it is clear that you are not the answer and I must continue my search elsewhere. I came hoping to achieve an adjustment to life through you. Now I un derstand that life is not that way. One never adjusts. One keeps on searching. . . . I will miss you."
From an existential point of view, any other ending of psychotherapy represents, at best, a grand misunderstanding on the part of the patient, and at worst a folie a deux between patient and therapist. A thera pist who seems to promise freedom from anxiety or that his message will be available to assuage the patient's anxiety in perpetuity misrepresents the world to the patient and to himself. The world is and always will be filled with abundant reasons for profound Vol. 18, No. 6 anxiety. Whatever were the initial hopes for a perpetual link, the ending of therapy sees doctor and patient going separately, each living with the anxiety of being a finite being, each seeking elsewhere what could not result for either from the therapy. At the end therapy becomes or is revealed as 'not it'. 'It' is what is sought as life continues.
What are the hidden assumptions in the beginning moments of therapy? How does therapy ordinarily begin? What are the secret hopes which patient and therapist bring to their encounter? Traditional posturings and external trappings aside, what is the nature of the 'lived life experience' of the therapist and the patient in the mo ments when psychotherapy begins? Many such relationships begin something like this: the patient, as supplicant, comes at a mo ment in his life when he feels defeated, unsuccessful and unfulfilled. In the lives of most people, doctors and patients alike, life has high and low periods and the patient comes for help when 'down'. In that mo ment of first encounter an artificial differ ence between the patient and the therapist may be suggested and both may overlook the overriding truth that they share an overwhelming amount in common. Indeed, the more sophisticated patient often comes with a fear of being rejected altogether by the therapist if he fails to pass the 'patient acceptability test' which therapists of all persuasions tend to impose. For many psy chotherapists a rather neurotically rein forcing personal moment may occur as the result of an initial interview conducted with dazzling compassion, empathy and precision •-and then, the following apologia: "Would that my own busy, crowded, already overcommitted schedule could include you. Alas, this not being so, I will help you find some one less busy who could 'accept' you." The patient in therapy may come to know him self as among those chosen. Inevitably, the therapist is in the life role of the chooser. The role of chosen, like the role of chooser, is intoxicating and both roles may become powerfully self-serving. Once they are es tablished in this manner, both parties may work to keep their roles intact, for both chooser and chosen are freed of the neces sity to face their existential realities while relaxing in those roles. Unfortunately, there is much in traditional psychotherapeutic sys tems which clothes the therapist in a charis matic garb, and thereby helps to perpetuate such distortions. There is often within the therapist himself that little voice which sings out affirmatively the greatest delusion in the mental health world -'the patients are right. I know how people should live their lives. I am graced with this wonderful intui tive gift. I am immortal.' Thus, a psychotherapeutic stage is set. Or, more accurately, the psychotherapeutic set is staged -the impresario and the under study, each with a script in which the begin ning of psychotherapy points precisely and inauthentically away from a successful, exis tential ending of psychotherapy.
Not only are the assumptions and hopes of both the therapist and the patient impor tant in determining the beginning and the ending of therapy, not only are both deeply interrelated and largely incomprehensible except as contingent one upon the other, they are also incomprehensible without an understanding of the goals which are in people's minds and which determine their actions and attitudes. Indeed, every aspect of psychotherapy can be understood only on the footing provided by an answer to the question, 'What are we up to as we live our lives'? Finding an answer is not easy. Contemporary Western, industrialized cul ture (and perhaps every culture) educates people away from the ability to answer the questions, 'What are you feeling?', 'What do you want?' Usually, in response to such an inquiry, a reply of 'how one should be feeling' is heard or, even further removed, 'how one would probably be discovered to be feeling if there were technical instru ments to allow an objective approach'. Strauss (8) has pointed out that when a con temporary man is asked what it is like to breathe, he will ordinarily respond some thing about oxygen going in and carbon dioxide emerging. Man's loss of self as the primary measure of existence may be exem plified by the boy and the girl sitting to-gether on the couch. He is mathematically trained and shy. Perhaps he is a psycholo gist. She waits impatiently. Finally, after a long period of inaction, she says to him, "I'll bet your arm would just fit around my waist". And he replies, "Let's get a tape measure and find out".
The Symptom in Perspective
What is a symptom? When the 'symptom complaint' or circumstances which bring the patient to the therapist are viewed in an existential perspective, it becomes clear that the symptom cannot stand alone.
Neither can the initial complaint be fully under stood from a frame of reference of aberrant behaviour or deviation from some agreed upon 'norm'. Instead, diagnosis -a clari fication of the meaning of a symptommust await answers to: 'What is it like to live in his world?' And 'What is missing in his experiencing of his world?' The symp tom proves to be opaque except in the broader frame of reference. Nevertheless, questions about 'life' are troubling and seem more appropriate for the contemplation of a poet or theologian than a clinician. Fur ther, making an issue of the life of the individual designated as a patient rather than scrutinizing that person's symptom or 'sickness' in turn raises the questions: 'How is life for other people, most of the time?', 'What is it like to live the life of the typical individual?' The answer to these kinds of inquiries, derived from an existential point of view, is unexpected and startling. Exis tential analysis reveals that, 'proximally and for the most part',t people, all people, are engaged relentlessly in being 'not them selves'. The 'normal state' proves to be a continual denial of self, a turning away, a losing of one's sense of individuality, a kind of inauthentic attempt to convert T to 'us' (2).
Jung, philosopher, mystic, psychoanalyst and, now and again, existentialist, expressed this idea in these words: t'Proxjmally and fpr the most part' is a concept developed by Heidegger to designate the ordinary, 'naturally occurring' everyday experience of life, an experience which he believes is characterized by eva siveness, idle talk, a turning away from significant questions about one's life and above all, a flight from awareness of death as one's ownmost possibility'. "The emphasis for understanding man should rest upon his mode of differentiation and individual development and, with most men, the process does not proceed far. They go to their grave as children. In place of the parents, they substitute a 'participation mys tique' with the life of the group. In other words, the mass of men live within the bounds of tradition which provides con venient substitutes such as organized religions for their unconscious submission to the parental psyche. Unconsciously, they identify themselves with the tribe, society, the church, the nation. The mechanism of convention keeps people unconscious and then, like wild game, they can follow their customary run ways without the necessity of conscious choice . . . most people are prone to take the easier, in a sense less demanding way of life, although such a way of life is disastrous to personal development. There is no coming to individual consciousness without pain. The critical survey of himself and his fate per mits a man to recognize his individuality, but this knowledge does not come to him easily. It is gained only through the severest shocks." (4) Kaiser expressed a similar view when he wrote, "We . . . experience only rarely the full awareness of our individuality and when we do, we suffer from it, because long before the experience becomes sharp enough to cause pain, we find a protective device which softens its impact -a delusionary device, as I have to say now. Mankind is suffering from an inborn weakness, a congenital Achil les' heel; or rather we would be suffering from it, if we would not cover it up by some magician's trick. We are marching in step, we are staying in line, and this allows us to feel that one and the same mind controls our bodies. Only when we find a stone in our way and have to decide, individually, whether to pass it to the right or the left does the delusion break down and we recog nize with dismay that the delusion is ours. It is not that the delusion is so attractive in itself; the primary fact is our intolerance for what we recognize as the truth when we are forced to think of it -our basic isola tion. That explains the large variety of delu sional devices. Whatever we can use to ob scure our isolation serves the purpose and is welcome" (5).
A 'flight from individuation' is the central idea in Heidegger's painstaking major work, Being and Time. He asks: "Who am (I)?
Who is it that is doing the experiencing? How is it, 'proximally and for the most part' Vol. 18, No. 6 in average everyday living for most of (us)?" And he answers: "(We) ourselves are not; (our) being has been taken away by the others. (Our) every day possibilities of being are for the others to dispose of as 'they' please. These others, moreover, are not definite others. On the contrary, any other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domi nation by others which has already been taken over unawares from ourselves). . . . One belongs to the other's oneself and en hances their power. The others whom one must designate in order to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them are those who proximally and for the most part are there in everyday being with one another. The who is not this one, not that one, not one self, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The who is the neuter, the they.tt . . . (we) take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; (we) read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise, (we) shrink back from the great mass as they shrink back; (we) find shocking what they find shocking. Thethey which is nothing definite and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness . . . further the-they can as it were, manage to have them constantly invoking it. 'It' can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. 'It was always the-they who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been no one. In our everydayness, the agency through which most things come about is one of which we might say that it was no one."ttf (3)
Paraphrasing the words of Jung, Kaiser and Heidegger, "I, myself am not. My being has been taken over by the others. I flee from my finiteness and from my sense of individuality. I flee from awareness of my self as a part of the human situation."
The problem in psychotherapy, existential vari ety, is how to assist the patient to discon tinue his flight from himself and to take over the responsibility to discover who he or she can be. The analysis of symptoms on a lesser stage will be misleading.
tfln German, das man. tttln Being and Time, Heidegger's major work, the concept of "being-in-the-world" (dasein) broadens and replaces such pronouns as I, my, his, he, etc. How ever, the concept is an intricate and far reaching one which, among other things, makes translation difficult. In the paragraph above, use of pronouns does some violence to Heidegger's thinking and fails to encompass all that was originally written. Hopefully the indi cated substitutions will be hetoful for the reader who is not familiar with Heidegger's writings.
It may be possible to illustrate the in fluence of an existential perspective upon the understanding of a symptom by de scribing the behaviour of a young woman, a dependent and shy person who sought treatment because of generalized anxiety, a fear of being alone and a specific concern that she might harm herself. Her symptoms developed immediately after she had been abandoned by a sometimes brutalizing and dominating fiance upon whom she had been quite dependent for a period of two years. Symbolic of one part of their relationship was that she had let her driver's licence lapse at his suggestion, had allowed him to select her clothing and had taken on his political activism although she had little fundamental interest in such matters. She overlooked his domination because, "I wasn't afraid of anything when I was with Jack. I had always been insecure. But, with Jack, I felt confident." She had, in essence, adopted in her relationship with her fiance a style of living which said, inauthentically and almost delusionally, "As long as Jack stands between the world and me, I need not fear. And he is immortal." When her fiance abandoned her she was thrown back towards herself. Old fears recurred. She was easily startled and tears came with no provocation. She was fearful, as she had been in childhood, that a mouse or a rat would enter her room. She also had more global fears including a persistent dread that she might harm herself or that in crises calling for flight she might become para lyzed. In coming to the doctor she appealed for help, medicine, reassurance, and so on. She was desperate and seemed without hope of helping herself. But when the doctor pressed on and asked for more details as to what she was feeling, he learned that she had moments in which she appreciated that her Jack was 'a stinker' and that she was glad that he was gone. She was aware that she had felt dominated by him and wondered whether she might now have a greater chance at self-expression. She re counted her parents' disapproval of his treatment of her and the general disdain with which all of her friends had regarded him. She wondered somehow as to why she involved herself with him in the first place and mused that "he sort of took me over." And in the same breath, she said to her doctor, "I'll do anything you tell me. I'll take anything you give me. Put me in the hospital. You've got to do something."
The doctor viewed her symptoms and the pull they exerted upon him with a strange ambivalence. It was true that he could re assure her, could offer drugs which would cut the level of her anxiety, could provide a hospital where there are no mice and where she would not be alone. Yet he hesitated lest, in doing so, he would rein force his patient's fear of confronting her self. Her proposal was: "So long as he lives, giant that he is with his white coat, his pills and his hospital, I need not concern myself about the meaning of my being." He won dered whether by accepting this he might actually destroy the potential for growth toward individuation present in that mo ment. In deciding how to respond to the request of his patient, the therapist had to remember that she was free of anxiety while she related to her fiance. Yet freedom from anxiety on the terms she had evolved be fore is not an adequate goal of his thera peutic efforts since this freedom was won by a flight from herself.
What is maturity?
A mature person is open to the experience of his world, directly, personally, unam biguously. He is excited about and grateful for his life. He is curious about what is true, is drawn to it, both with regard to his own feelings and with regard to what he sees in himself and in the people, the organizations and the objects in his world. He struggles to come close to himself by being honest. Insofar as he is a self-divided, he seeks his own union. His fundamental attitude mir rors Carl Roger's words, "In the long run, the facts are friendly." (6) His essential orientation is a phenomenological one, as defined by Heidegger, "To the things them selves. Let that which is show itself in itself." It is not necessary for him to lie about what exists in the world (2).
Maturity also requires an awareness of the limited quantity of personal time and space -an appreciation of the finiteness of human existence. Consequently, the mature person wants to be the one who chooses for himself: what he will do, how he will live, how he will spend himself in his limited time and space. This wish to assume an increasingly responsible decision-making role in one's own life is a central matter. Whitaker states, "Wellness is perceived as, fundamentally, the increasing capacity to choose. Shorn of all of its frills sickness is perceived as any hindrance to free choice. Choice is seen as more than a conscious intellectual exercise. The well person chooses correctly without thinking." (9) Successful therapy often changes an in dividual's attitude to other people. There may be less possessiveness and at the same time more reverence. Above all, there is usually a fuller appreciation of the existentiality of others. Our fate is common. The joys of experiencing and choosing for one's self are desired for one's fellows. This is the matter of love. The adjective checklist for maturity, existential variety, includes: aware ness, unwillingness to lie, the thing itself, concern and solicitude, openness. What a long distance lies between the role of under study to the impresario and an adjective checklist which means becoming an indivi dual.
The Technique of Therapy
When it comes to spelling out the 'how to do it' aspects of existential psychother apy, particular difficulty is encountered. Ob viously, there is an important existential dimension in therapies which bear other labels. Perhaps any approach is 'existential' which is undertaken in a spirit of parity between therapist and patient and which does not obscure the future which will see therapist and patient continuing their life searches individually. Hopefully, the thera pist and the patient will each be enriched and made more curious about life by virtue of their contact with each other.
Certainly, existential psychotherapy can not be conducted according to a script. Sue-Vol. 18, No. 6 cess, if it comes, may be more a conse quence of the spirit in which the therapy is conducted than the techniques employed. Of that spirit, Sartre writes, "But the principal result of existential psychoanalysis must be to make us repudiate the spirit of serious ness. The spirit of seriousness has two char acteristics; it considers values as transcen dent, given independent of human subjec tivity, and it transfers the quality of 'desir able' from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution. For the spirit of seriousness, for example, bread is desirable because it is necessary to live (a value written in an intelligible heaven) and because bread is nourishing. The result of the serious attitude, which as we know rules the world, is to cause the symbolic values of things to be drunk in by their empirical ideosyncrasy as ink by a blotter; . . . thus, (ruled by the spirit of serious ness) man pursues being blindly by hiding from himself the free project which is this pursuit. He makes himself such that he is waited for by all the tasks placed along his way. Objects are mute demands and his is nothing in himself but the passive obedience to these demands." (7) There is an Hasidic legend which tells of Zusha the rabbi who lay dying. He called his family and students together and told them, "When I meet my creator, he will not say, 'Zusha, why were you not as Moses?' He will say, 'Zusha, why were you not as Zusha'?" (1) Man is essentially a bulb with many thousands of roots. In him the nerves alone feel; the rest serves to hold them together and to move them about more conveniently. What we see then is the pot in which the man (the nerves) is planted.
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